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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH

SANDRA BEYNON,
Plaintiff/Appellant

Case No. 91-0551

vs.
ST. GEORGE - DIXIE LODGE
# 1743, BENEVOLENT &
PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS,
Defendant/Appellee

REPLY OF APPELLANT
TO BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
CONPOR

APPEAL PROM THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY
THE HONORABLE PHILIP EVES, JUDGE PRESIDING
Trial Court Case No. 90-050-3229

Plaintiff\Appellant, SANDRA BEYNON (hereinafter "Ms.
Beynon"), by and through her counsel of record John Pace and
Brian M. Barnard of the Utah Legal Clinic on behalf of the
Utah Civil Rights and Liberties Foundation, Inc., submits
the following BRIEF in response to the amicus

curiae

brief

filed by the Conference of Private Organizations (hereinafter "CONPOR" or "amicus")

and dated October 15, 1992.
1

STATEMENT OP FACTS
The statement of Essential Facts on Appeal by the
CONPOR is remarkable in several ways.
(hereinafter "CONPOR Brief") at 2-3.
to the trial record.

Amicus

CONPOR Brief

There are no citations

Several "facts" mentioned are not of

record in this case (whether true or not) and many are
irrelevant— for example, the defendant/appellee, St.
George-Dixie Lodge #1743, Benevolent and Protective Order of
Elks (hereinafter the "Lodge" or the "Elks Lodge") has an
"occupancy permit" for its building and a "health permit"
for its dining facility, the Lodge does not receive public
funds, the Lodge's building is not on public property, the
Lodge gets its electricity and water from the municipal
systems, etc.1

Given its displayed lack of knowledge of the

1

Perhaps these "facts" were just left on a word
processor from when CONPOR filed an amicus brief in some
other case. Similarly, CONPOR's lengthy discussion of
"state action" (CONPOR Amicus Brief, pp. 5-12) seems to be
taken from another brief and shoved into CONPOR's brief
herein. "State action," which might be relevant under a
14th Amendment analysis in federal court, is not relevant in
this case.
CONPOR also seems to think that plaintiff wants the
Court to order the state to remove or deny defendant a
liquor license (Id., p. 4; p. 5; p. 17) plaintiff has not so
requested in this action. Denial of or the removal of the
defendant's liquor licenses has never been an issue.
Needless to say if the St. George Elks Lodge were to
give up its state liquor and beer licenses,- it would no
longer be "an enterprise regulated by the state" subject ta
the Utah Civil Rights Act. The Civil Rights Act would then
2

issues and facts of this case, CONPOR's service to the Court
as an amicus

curiae

in this case must be questioned.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The "male-only" membership policies of the Elks Lodge
violate the Utah Civil Rights Act.

No reading of the

statute nor arguments forwarded by the CONPOR can put the
Lodge 7 s discriminatory practices beyond the reach of this
important civil rights legislation.
gender discrimination by the Lodge —

Indeed, the blatant
coupled with the fact

that this conduct is associated with the auspices of the
state —

represents the exact behavior that Utah's anti-

discrimination statute declares unlawful.

When the Elks

Lodge specifically excludes women from its membership, it
perpetuates the offensive and humiliating effects of gender
discrimination and endangers the health and welfare of
Utah's citizens.
To guarantee all individuals "full and equal
availability of all goods, services and facilities"
regardless of their sex, the Utah Civil Rights Act forbids
gender discrimination by all business establishments and

apply only because the Elks Lodge is a "business establishment ."
3

enterprises regulated by the state.

U.C.A. §§ 13-7-1, et

seq. (1953 as amended).

The Lodge —

commercial activities —

is a business establishment for the

purposes of the Act.

engaged in public and

In addition, as the beneficiary of

state beer and liquor licenses, the Lodge is an enterprise
regulated by the state.
Accordingly, the Elks Lodge cannot legitimately plead
exemption to Utah's civil rights legislation.

The Lodge has

long forsaken any claims of intimacy and private association
by actively seeking and accepting state licenses to sell
beer and alcohol and by offering its facilities and services
to the public.

Far from occurring in surroundings analogous

one's home and amongst individuals who share relationship
similar to family members, the gender discrimination
practiced by the Elks Lodge takes place publicly, commercially and pervasively.
Finally, given the distinct trend in other jurisdictions to prevent male-only clubs from excluding women as
members, application of the Utah Civil Rights Act to the
Elks Lodge is over due.

Importantly, civil rights

legislation with narrower sweeps and less exacting texts
than the Utah statute has been repeatedly interpreted as
prohibiting the exclusionary membership policies adopted by
4

the Lodge.

Case law which has enforced language and purpose

similar to that of Utah lawmakers also confirms that the
statute prohibits the Lodge's discriminatory conduct.

In

light of the firm legal, policy, and moral foundations for
Ms. Beynon's claim that she is entitled not to be classified
and restricted based solely upon her gender, CONPOR's
arguments necessarily fail.

ARGUMENT
I. Enforcement of the Utah Civil Rights Act Against the
Elks Lodge is Not Dependant on the Presence of State Action.
Demonstrating unfamiliarity with state civil rights
legislation in general, and the Utah Civil Rights Act in
particular, CONPOR expends considerable space and effort to
argue that Utah's licensing of the Lodge is insufficient to
constitute state action.2

Amicus

CONPOR's Brief at 5-12.

However, Ms. Beynon's claim is not based upon the federal
Bill of Rights nor upon the power of Congress to regulate
conduct under the federal commerce clause.

Instead, Ms.

Beynon asserts that the Lodge's discriminatory membership
practices violate the Utah Civil Rights Act —
2

state

Interestingly, CONPOR cites only federal cases in
its amicus brief, seeming to ignore that this is a state
claim brought in state court under Utah's unique state civil
rights statute.
5

legislation enacted pursuant to Utah's authority to police
the health and safety of its citizens.
"police" power clearly belongs to Utah.

Such regulatory
In any case, the

Lodge has not challenged the authority of the state to
prohibit discrimination and defends itself in this action by
maintaining that the Utah Civil Rights Act was not intended
to reach Elk Lodge activities.
The Utah Attorney General, as a statutory party to this
action, also confirms that "state action" is not relevant to
this case:
Although Utah could probably show "state action"
in its farther reaching involvement as an active
market participant in the liquor industry, it is a
completely different question of whether Utah may
prohibit discrimination, as an additional
regulation upon the liquor industry as part of its
police powers.
Brief of Attorney General at 18 (emphasis original).3

Ms.

Beynon's claim has never rested upon state action and the
application of federal anti-discrimination protections, but

3

As the Attorney General points out in his Brief, the
Lodge shares CONPOR's confusion of the issues in this case.
Many of the Lodge's arguments for exemption from Utah's
antidiscrimination statute mistakenly rely upon federal
civil rights claims that are ultimately decided upon the
matter of state action. Because the question of state
action is not before this Court, the relevancy of these is
cases is minimal. See, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Ivris, 407
U.S. 124 (1972) (a state licensing scheme insufficient state
action for the purposes of federal equal protection law).
6

instead is based upon state protections and the authority of
the state to regulate the conduct of persons, even private
actors within the state.

Accordingly, state action is not

an issue before this Court.4

II.

The Elks Lodge is Subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act.
As a business establishment and an enterprise regulated

by the state, the Lodge is prohibited from discriminating
against Ms. Beynon on the basis of her sex.

A holder of

state licenses to sell beer and alcohol, the Lodge has
solicited and submitted to state supervision including the
state legislation which prohibits gender discrimination.

In

addition, the Lodge conducts itself as a business, making
4

In arguing that there is no state action in this
case, CONPOR advances other unpersuasive contentions. For
example, the amicus contends that a practicing attorney —
presumably in Utah — can refuse to represent a client for
any discriminatory reason. CONPOR fails to realize that the
Utah Civil Rights Act specifically prohibits an attorney
from discriminating against clients on the basis of an
invidious classification. A practicing attorney in Utah is
a business establishment and her office is a place of public
accommodation for the purposes of the Utah Civil Rights Act
and her conduct is subject to the state's antidiscrimination mandate.
Oddly, CONPOR also warns (or imagines) that application
of the Utah Civil Rights Act to the Lodge would open
religious organizations to regulation by the state.
CONPOR's Brief at 10. Again the amicus exhibits
unfamiliarity with Utah's civil rights legislation which
specifically exempts churches from the reach of the statute.
U.C.A. § 13-7-3 (1953 as amended).
7

substantial sums of money by selling liquor, beer and food,
running what is essentially a public restaurant, and renting
its facilities to the public.
traits —

The Lodge's business-like

including its utilization of its state liquor and

beer licenses —

coupled with its solicitation and

acceptance of state regulation indicate that the Elks Lodge
is welL within the reach of Utah's anti-discrimination
edict.5

5

Throughout its brief, CONPOR repeatedly stresses
that a liquor license issued to a "private" club such as the
Lodge, is a substantial benefit to the club. Indeed, CONPOR
would consider the denial or cancellation of this license to
be akin to punishment of the Lodge. CONPOR Brief at 4-5
(for example,
"Plaintiff and the Attorney General do not
seek redress but punishment of the Lodge by imposition of a
financial hardship through removal of their [sic] liquor
license." ) (emphasis added). CONPOR's admission underlines
the extent to which the Lodge is a beneficiary of state
privileges and state regulation and the extent to which
these privileges are essential to the economic well-being of
the Lodge. CONPOR's emphasis upon the importance of the
Lodge's commercial nature — centered around the selling of
beer and alcohol — only reaffirms Ms. Beynon's assertion
that the Lodge is a business. In addition, CONPOR points
out that the commercial success of the Lodge is dependent on
a state privilege. Because Utah lawmakers determined that
whenever extensive state regulation entangle the state in
the affairs of the monitored enterprise — and CONPOR points
out how extensive and important this entanglement is —
discrimination could not be tolerated for fear that this
undesirable conduct would be encourage by or associated with
the state's presence and support.
When CONPOR suggests that Ms. Beynon is seeking to
punish the Lodge, CONPOR is in error. Ms. Beynon seeks
redress only in the form of injunctive and declaratory
relief, not in the form of money damages. Ms. Beynon is
only cisking this Court to enforce the law and put an end to
the Lodge's invidious discrimination.
8

A.

The Elks Lodge is an Enterprise Regulated by the State.
The purpose, the language and the policy of the Utah

Civil Rights Act all command otherwise, nevertheless CONPOR
argues that the statute is not applicable to the Elks Lodge.
Ignoring the directive that the Utah Civil Rights Act is to
be liberally construed, CONPOR suggests a narrow reading of
"enterprises regulated by the state" to exempt the Lodge
from the statute.6

Yet, CONPOR offers no credible reasons

as to why the Lodge —

a beneficiary of state beer and

liquor licenses and subject to supervision by the state

—

is not an enterprise or business regulated by the state.7

6

CONPOR asserts without citation to any authority
that enterprises regulated by the state "must be considered
in connection with the more limiting language describing
business establishments and places of public accommodation."
CONPOR Brief at 15. Yet, CONPOR fails to note that the
statute does not limit or define "business establishments"
in any way. Indeed, the similar absence of a definition or
a listing of examples of "business establishments" prompted
the California Supreme Court to interpret the term as
broadly as reasonably possible. Burks v. Poppy Construction
Company, 370 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1962).
7

CONPOR argues that the Lodge is not an enterprise
regulated by the state by pointing to supposed contradictions in the Attorney General's Brief. First, CONPOR
misstates the Attorney General's position, wrongly insisting
that the Attorney General "acknowledged that the Lodge is
not a *business' within the meaning of the term *business
establishment' because it is not open to the public and is
not operated for profit." CONPOR Brief at 16. Actually,
the Attorney General merely noted that the definition of
"business establishments" would include "all profit
motivated or commercially oriented entities . . . "
Indeed,
the Attorney General then argued that the Lodge is a
9

If CONPOR's less than reflective interpretation of the
Utah Civil Rights Act were adopted, the legislative intent
to have the Act construed liberally would be frustrated.

In

addition, the 1973 amendment to the Utah Civil Rights Act,
meant to extend the application of the act to enterprises
regulated by the state, would be made superfluous.

Because

the Act before 1973 already prohibited discrimination in
"all business establishments," the new provision including
enterprises regulated by the state must be read as expanding
the scope of Utah / s civil rights legislation beyond business
establishments.

Accordingly, "business" for the purpose of

state regulation after 1973 cannot be limited to those
"business establishments" subject to the Act prior to 1973.
By expanding the scope of Utah's civil rights
legislation in 1973 to reach enterprises regulated by the
state, Utah lawmakers expressed deep concern that invidious
discrimination not be associated with state regulation,
authorization or privilege.

Lawmakers determined that when

discrimination has the appearance of state assistance or

"business" for the purposes § 13-7-2 (3)b of the Utah Civil
Rights Act. Brief of Attorney General, pp. 6 et. seq.
Second, CONPOR ignores Ms. Beynon's extensive arguments and
references to state case law which indicate that the term
"business establishment" includes more than just profit
motivated entities open to the general public. Appellant's
Reply Brief at 12-2 0.
10

approval, it is particularly objectionable.

Thus, a proper

interpretation of the Act is that exactly because the Elks
Xodge is licensed by the state to sell beer and liquor, it
is an enterprise regulated by the state.

Utah does not

allow truly private actors, ordinary citizens, to sell beer
and alcohol from their residences, and therefore the state
considers every entity that it licenses to sell beer a
business.

B.

The Elks Lodge is a Business Establishment
Further, CONPOR's argument that the Elks Lodge is not a

business which sells beer and alcohol and is not a business
establishment rests on the same misconception that a nonprofit membership organization cannot be a business.
However, a multitude of state and federal court decisions
have held otherwise.

United State Jaycees v. McClure, 305

N.W.2d 764, 768-769 (Minn. 1981); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (local chapters of the Jaycees
held to be "business facilities" for the purpose of the
Minnesota Civil Rights Act although a nonprofit membership
organization); Rotary Club of Duarte v. Bd. of Dirs. of
Rotary International, 224 Cal.Rptr. 213 (Cal.App.2 Dist.
1986), Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary International v. Rotary Club,
481 U.S. 537 (1987) (Rotary Club, a private, non-profit
11

corporation, a "business establishment'); O'Connor v.
Village Green Owners Association, 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983)
(condominium association, a non-profit association, a
"business establishment"); Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa
Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985) (Boys' Club, a private,
non-profit corporation, affiliated with the Boys' Club of
America, a "business establishment"); Curran v. Mount Diablo
Council of Boy Scouts, 195 Cal.Rptr. 325 (Cal.App.2 Dist..
1983) (Boy Scouts, a non-profit organization a "business
establishment"); Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club,
262 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Cal.App.l Dist. 1989) (a non-profit,
privately owned and operated, social and recreational club a
"business establishment"); Lloyds Lions Club v. Int.
Association of Lions Clubs, 724 P.2d 887 (Or.App. 1986),
petition for review dismissed, 740 P.2d 182 (Or. 1987)
(nonprofit, private, selective membership club).
As are the various organizations involved in the
foregoing cases, the Lodge is a non-profit, membership
organization that is a business for the purposes of the
relevant civil rights legislation.

The Lodge exhibits

enough of the characteristics of a commercial enterprise,
and is sufficiently open to the public to constitute a
business.

In addition to its state licenses to sell beer

and alcohol, the Lodge has a St. George City business
12

license.

Brief of Appellant at 10.

In return for the

privilege of being granted these state licenses, the Elks
Lodge must have a current city business license and must
abide by extensive state guidelines that govern the
distribution of beer and liquor.

Alcoholic Beverage Control

Act, Title 32A, Utah Code Ann. (1986) .

Far from a small or

intimate operation, the Elks Lodge sells one-quarter of a
million dollars ($250,000.00) of liquor annually and has
assets that exceed one million three hundred thousand
dollars ($1,300,000.00+).

Appellant's Brief at 10.

For

example, for the 198 6 fiscal year, the lodge earned
$25,197.00 from rental of its facility.
Interestingly, a Michigan State Circuit Court recently
ruled that under its Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act,
Michigan Complied Laws (MCL) §§ 37.101, et seg,8 the
Rochester Michigan Elks Lodge was prohibited from rejecting
a woman's membership application solely on the basis of her
gender.

Schellenberg v. Rochester, Michigan Elks Lodge No.

2225, No. 88-351-793-NZ (Mich.Cir.Ct. Nov. 15, 1989),
decision attached as Exhibit "D".

This ruling was based

upon the commercial and public nature of the Rochester
Lodge.

Even though the Michigan Civil Rights Act prohibits

MSA 3.548(101), et seg.
13

discrimination only in places of public accommodation "whose
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise
made available to the public,"

MCL 37.2301(a) (emphasis

added), the Court had no difficulty in finding that the
Rochester Lodge was a place of public accommodation.
A.7.

Id. at

Significant to the Court's conclusion was that the

Lodge "operated a de facto

restaurant."

Id.

The Lodge also

held weekly bingo games and an annual craft show open to the
public.

Id.

Also contributing to the Court's determination

that the Rochester Lodge dining facility was essentially
public was the observation that although the Rochester Lodge
dining room was theoretically open only to members and their
guests, food and drinks were ordered and paid for without a
showing of membership.

Jd. at A.5

Like its Rochester counterpart, the St. George Elks
Lodge is an open and commercial enterprise.

The St. George

Lodge's dining and banquet facilities are open for private
and business functions to its members, their families, their
employers and their guests. Appellant's Brief at 11. In
addition to serving food and beverages to lodge customers,
the Elks Lodge is used for receptions, business meetings and
parties and defendant rents the facility to the public for

14

similar events.9

Id.

Non-members and members alike order

and pay for food, drink and services they receive at the
lodge, placing the lodge in direct competition with other
businesses in St. George that also sell food and beverages.
Id.

Indeed, Ms. Beynon, obviously without a showing of

membership, has purchased beer and wine at the lodge during
the four (4) years prior to this suit.

Id. at 11-12.

The same factors which convinced the Michigan trial
court that the Rochester Elks Lodge was a place of public
accommodation are present in the instant case.10

The public

and commercial nature of the St. George Lodge confirms that
it is both a business that sells beer and alcohol and a
business establishment.

III. Federal First Amendment Guarantees of Freedom of
Intimate and Expressive Association Do Not Prohibit
Application of the Utah Civil Rights Act to the Elks Lodge.
Truly private clubs are protected from state regulation
by the right to freedom of association.

Although CONPOR

argues otherwise, the Lodge does not qualify as an intimate

9

For a non-member to rent the facility, she or he
need only be sponsored by a member who must be present
during the event.
10

The Schellenbera case now on appeal was argued
before the Michigan Court of Appeals on November 4, 1992,
Case Nos. 123738, 131716.
15

or expressive association.

For many of the same reasons

that the Lodge is an enterprise regulated by the state and
is a business enterprise, it has relinquished any status as
a truly private club.

As emphasized above, the Lodge

maintains a public and commercial profile, profiting from
the state licensed sale of beer and liquor and from the
rental of its facilities to the public.

Because the Lodge

has opened itself to state regulation, it cannot simultaneously claim immunity from state anti-discrimination
supervision.
Further factors confirm that the Lodge is not entitled
to First Amendment protection -— the Lodge is not a small,
intimate, selective organization.

The United State Supreme

Court has consistently held that the essence of privacy is
selectivity.

Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Associ-

ation, 410 U.S. 431, 438 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969).

If there is little or no

selectivity in a club's membership, there is no basis to
claim privacy.

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.

609 (1984); Bd. of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).

The Lodge has the burden

of establishing that its is deserves First Amendment
protection.

United States Power Squadrons v. State Human

Rights Appeal Bd.. 542 N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (NY 1983) ("[Club
16

members] have the burden of establishing its entitlement to
exclusion.

It is they who are familiar with the policies

and practices of the club and have available the documents
and records necessary to establish their claim.").
To reject the claim by the Rochester Elks Lodge of
private club exemption under the Michigan Elliot-Larsen
Civil Rights Act and to First Amendment protection, the
Michigan Circuit Court emphasized that the "factors of size
and selectivity weigh heavily against finding [the Rochester
Lodge] to be a private club."
at A.8.

Rochester Elks Lodge,

supra

Analyzing the identical admission criteria involved

in the case at bar, the Michigan Court determined that at
the Rochester Lodge, "membership procedure is a mere
formality.

No significant process of selection can be found

in a process that weeds out less than two percent of the
applicants."11

Id.

Unimpressed by the Elks' list of

11

The Michigan Court found no difficulty in
distinguishing Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of
the Elks, 382 F.Supp 1182 (D.Conn 1974), which found a
Connecticut Elks Lodge to be a private club under federal
civil rights law. In Cornelius there was no evidence to
counter the claim by the Connecticut Lodge that its
membership procedure was genuinely selective. Rochester
Lodge at A.8; Cornelius at 12 04. Cornelius also predated,
by a decade, the Roberts, supra,
and Rotary.
supra,
decisions, in which the United States Supreme Court examined
the size, purpose, policies, selectivity and other relevant
characteristics of each club. In contrast, the Michigan
Court noted that Ms. Schellenberg had introduced convincing
documentation that the Rochester Lodge was not a genuinely
17

membership standards, the Michigan Court noted that
11

[n]early all of the applicants who follow though with the

[membership] process are accepted."

Id. at A.4.

Significantly, the Rochester Lodge had 1,800 member, and
over the part 15 years, only 20 applicants had been
rejected.

Id.

Like the Rochester Lodge, the St. George Lodge is an
organization with a large membership and without a genuinely
selective membership procedure.

Like the Rochester Lodge,

the St. George Lodge is not a truly private club.

Although

the Elks Lodges list ten (10) characteristics as its
membership standards, these criteria are not applied to
create a selective, intimate organization.

Most, if not

all, men who apply are allowed to join the Lodge.

Three St.

George Elks Lodge members testified that during their thirty
one (31) , thirty eight (38) , and twenty nine (29) years of
membership, they witnessed respectively, the rejection of no
applications, maybe ten (10) applications and one (1)
application for membership.

Appellant's Brief at 8.

From

January, 1987 through June, 1989, the St. George Elks Lodge
members approved every application for membership presented
to them.

Id.

During those two and one half years, the

selective club. Rochester Lodge at A.8. For further
discussion of Cornelius, see Appellant's Brief at 9-12.
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investigation committee, whose duty it was to review the
qualifications of all applicants, never issued a negative
report on any applicant.

Id,

Nor is the St. George Lodge a small and intimate
association.

While about ten percent (10%) of the

membership drops out of the organization each year, the
Lodge annually increases its membership by fifteen percent
(15%).

Appellants Brief at 8-9.

At various Lodge

meetings, Lodge members are repeatedly encouraged to recruit
new membership.

Id.

Although the St. George Elks Lodge can

have members only from Washington County, Utah and small
adjoining areas of Nevada and Arizona, the lodge enjoys a
large membership of more than one thousand (1,000+) men.
Id.

This figure represents more than 6% of the male

population in Washington County and more than 8% of the male
population in St. George City.

Id.

There is no limit on

the number of men that can be members of the Elks Lodge.
Because the Lodge has not conducted itself as a truly
private club, it cannot claim First Amendment immunity from
the reach of the Utah Civil Rights Act.

Rather than

maintaining selective membership standards, the Lodge has
solicited a large membership and has admitted virtually
every male that has wished to join.

By offering its

facilities for rent and by running a restaurant in which
19

non-members can purchase food and alcohol, the Lodge has
opened itself to the public and lost any basis for a claim
of protected privacy.

Finally, the Lodge has accepted state

licenses to sell beer and alcohol, voluntarily submitting to
government supervision which necessarily falls upon the
beneficiaries of these state privileges.

No truly private

organization invites a state regulating body into its inner
sanctum.

CONCLUSION
The St. George Elks Lodge is not^insulated from the
reach of the Utah Civil Rights Act.

Utah has determined

that individuals and our society are entitled to be free
from the poisonous effects of unlawful discrimination.

The

Lodge has chosen to openly participate in our society,
offering its services and facilities to the public,
soliciting state benefits and profiting from state
privileges.

Yet, when asked to abide by the state enacted

antidiscrimination law which serves the health and welfare
of this society, suddenly the Lodge wants out.

The Lodge

does not want to treat the individuals who make up our
society with equal respect.

The Lodge wants to openly and

unabashedly deny Ms. Beynon access to its goods, services
and benefits simply because she is a women.
20

This

discrimination is unfair, undesirable, and most importantly,
unlawful.
For these reasons and in the interest of justice, this
Court should reverse the ruling and decision of the trial
court, determine that the Utah Civil Rights Act applies to
the Lodge and remand this case with instructions to the
trial court to enter judgment in favor of Ms. Beynon
granting declaratory and injunctive relief to end the
illegal gender discrimination practiced by the Lodge.
DATED this 13th day of NOVEMBER, 1992.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant

21

CERTIFICATE OP MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four (4)
true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF
SANDRA BEYNON TO AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF CONPOR to:
GLENN C. HANNI
G. ERIC NIELSON
STRONG & HANNI
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
FRANK MYLAR
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Statutory Party
State of Utah
6100 South 300 East, #204
Murray, Utah 84107
LEONARD J. SOLFA, JR.
Attorney for Amicus Curiae (CONPOR)
Conference of Private Organizations
Route 31
Moosheart, Illinois 60539-1117
on the 13th day of NOVEMBER, 1992, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff/

B:\BEYNON.ACR\ELKS

22

EXHIBIT
OPINION IN

SCHELLENBERG VS. ROCHESTER. MICHIGAN ELKS LODGE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR OAKLAND COUNTY, MICHIGAN
CASE NO. 88-351-793 NZ
NOVEMBER 15, 1989

STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF OAKLAND

SHARON*LEE SCHELLENBERG,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 88-351-793-NZ

vs.
ROCHESTER, MICHIGAN LODGE NO. 2225
OF THE BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE
ORDER OF ELKS OF THE USA, a nonprofit Michigan corporation,

ATRUECOPY
L**N 0. ALLEN

Defendants•
/

O P I N I O N

This Court has before it the parties' motion for
a judgment on stipulated facts.

MCR 2.116(A).

Plaintiff brine

this action under Section 302 of the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights
Act, MCL 37.101, et se£, MSA 3.548(101), et sej, alleging that
she has been denied full and equal enjoyment of the services
of a place of public accommodation or public service because
of sex.

Defendant admits that it has refused plaintiff members

in its organization but argues that it is not a place of public
accommodation or public service as those terms are defined
in the Act.

Rather, defendant argues that it is a private

club under Sec. 303 and therefore, exempt from the provisions
of Sec. 302.
Plaintiff is a realtor in the City of Rochester.
For approximately seven years prior to this litigation she
had enjoyed some of the defendant's services and facilities^
Plaintiff frequently ate lunch in the defendant's dining room
on work days with business associates.

The local Board of

Realtors often rents the defendant's facility for its meetings,
which plaintiff attejjgs.

Plaintiff also takes her mother to

the Elks Club for bingo on Wednesday nights.

[A-l]

Plaintiff testif:

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT * S
EXHIBIT "D"

that she ate at defendant's club so frequently that the doorperson
would let her in without her showing any proof that her husband
was a member.
In February, 1988, plaintiff completed a written
application for membership naming a sponsor member and two
member references.

Plaintiff wanted to join the Elks primarily

because it was a convenient and customary place for lunch on
weekdays*

Also, it was an appropriate place where she could

take her parents for dinner and dancing.

It is not disputed

that plaintiff's application was denied solely because she
is female.
Defendant is a local chapter of the Benevolent and
Protective Order of Elks of the United States of America (BPOE).
Defendant is incorporated in this stats as a fraternal association
pursuant to MCL 457.301; MSA 21.1291 and MCL 450.133; MSA 21.134.
Pursuant to defendant's Articles of Incorporation, it was formed,
"to inculcate the principals of Charity, Justice, Brotherly
Love and Fidelity to promote the welfare and enhance the happiness
of its members; to quicken the spirit of American patriotism;
to cultivate good fellowship; to perpetuate itself as a fraternal
organization; and to provide for its government."
is a non-profit tax-exempt corporation,

Defendant

in its promotional

brochure, What it Means to Be an Elk, pp 15-16, the Elks national
office proclaims:
The primary object of the Order is the
practice of charity in its broadest
significance, not merely that of alms
giving.
# * *
For many years the aggregate
expenditure* Of the Subordinate Lodges
for charitable purposes "have run into
million* of dollars each year, covering
humanitarian services of infinite variety.
Among the mo***J! of such activities
may be raentic oe following: food

rn
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to the hungry; shelter for the homeless;
clothing and fuel for the needy; milk
for the under-nourished babies; medical
attention to the sick; baskets to the
poor at Christmas and Thanksgiving;
outings for underprivileged children;
entertainments for shut-ins; education
for young people; artificial limbs for
the maimed; hospital beds; free clinics;
night schools* And the list might be
indefinitely extended.
All of the State Elks Associations
have undertaken important and extensive
charitable works within their own several
jurisdictions, determined by the particular
conditions therein existing and the
preferences of their constituent members.
They include rehabilitation of crippled
children, treatment of indigent tubercular
patients, provision for scholarships to
worthy students, maintenance of orphans,
boys' camps, training of the blind,
eyeglasses for needy boys and girls,
cerebral palsy clinics, cancer clinics,
and other state wide projects of similar
character and of equal worthiness, which
are being carried on as continuing
activities. No history of social service
in the United States would be complete
without an inspiring chapter devoted to
the achievements of the Order of Elks in
this field.
Membership in the Elks is limited to male citizens
of the United States of America not under the age of 21.
Constitution, Art VII, Sec 4.

Potential members must also be

believers in God and possess good moral character.
Statute, § 14.010.

Elks

Elks Annotated

Communists and persons who advocate the

overthrow of the government by force are not permitted to join.

The Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks has about
1.5 million members nationwide and about 50,000 members in 78
lodges in this state.
members.

In August, 1988, the defendant had 1,84;

In 1987, 126 men applied for membership with defendant.

One was rejected and three withdrew their applications.
1986, 119 men applied for membership with the defendant.
was rejected because he was nnt a United States citizen
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In
One

and three withdrew their applications.
for membership.
applications.

In 1985, 117 men applied

None were rejected though five withdrew their
During these most recent years less than two

percent of all applicants were rejected.

Over the past 15

years only 20 applicants have been rejected.
The defendant recruits new members primarily through
members' social contacts.

Members are encouraged in the monthly

newsletter to seek new members from among their friends.

The

recruit submits an application naming the sponsor member and
two member references.

If the application indicates that the

applicant meets the four basic membership requirements the
applicant is invited to sit for an interview.
is fairly short and informal.

The interview

One member of the investigating

committee who performed interviews stated that throughout over
100 interviews that he had performed, he had recommended every
applicant for membership.

The applicant is considered for

membership by the members in a vote.

Three negative votes

results in rejection of the applicant.

Nearly all of the

applicants who follow through with the process are accepted.
The defendant charges its new members an initiation
fee of $75 and each member pays annual dues of $75.

Dues and

fees account for approximately 70% of defendant's annual receipts.
Defendant's next largest source of income is from rental of
its facilities to other organizations.

For example, in 1987

and 1988, defendant rented its facilities to about 20 different
organizations on about 90 different occasions.

In 1988, rentals

accounted for approximately 13% of defendant's income.

Defendant

derives approximately nine percent of its income from weekly
bingo nights and less than two pe.rcent of its income from
advertisements placed in its local newsletter.

Defendant operates

a dining room or restatiHBE for its members and their guests

but does not appear to derive a profit from this activity.
The parties stipulated at oral argument that only
three percent of the defendant's income is directed to charitable
organizations and activities.

Defendant contributes $1 per

member annually to the statewide Michigan Elks major projects.
Defendant sponsors an annual hoop shoot for local youths and
assists a local law enforcement agency in its drug awareness
program.
The defendant operates a dining room as one of the
services it provides to its members.

According to the defendant's

own rules, the dining room is supposed to be open only to members
and their guests.

Guests are not supposed to be allowed to

purchase their own alcoholic beverages or food.

However, before

this litigation commenced these rules were not enforced.

One

of defendant's own waitresses, Janice Kline, stated that she
regularly provided separate checks for guests who requested
separate checks.

She was never told not to do this.

She also

served food and drinks without requesting to see membership
identification.

Two of plaintiff's female business associates

stated that they have used defendant's dining hall even though
they were not members.
to show identification.

No one in their group was ever asked
They all received separate checks

and paid for their own meals.
The issue before this Court is whether the defendant's'
decision to reject plaintiff's application solely on the basis
of sex violated the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act.

Section 302

of the Act provides:
Sec. 302. Except where permitted
by law, a person shall not:
(a) Deny an individual the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of a place of public
acconut
i or public service because
of rel
race, color, national
origir.
sex, or marital status.

For purposes of this Section, defendant is a person.
MCL 37.2103(f).
MCL 37.2301(a) and (b) define place of public
accommodation and public service as follows:
(a) 'Place of public accommodation*
means a business or an educational,
refreshment, entertainment, recreation,
health, or transportation facility, or
institution of any kind, whether licensed
or not, whose goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations
are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise
made available to the public.
(b) 'Public service' means a public
facility, department,* agency, board, orby or
commission, owned, operated, or managed
on behalf of the state, a political
subdivision, or an agency thereof, or a
tax exempt private agency established
to provide service to the public.
There is no Michigan case law further defining what
constitutes a "public service" under the above-quoted statute.
However, it is undisputed that defendant is a tax-exempt
corporation.

Furthermore, defendant's promotional literature

makes clear that the primary object of the defendant is the
practice of charity in its broadest significance including
such activities as providing food for the hungry, shelter for
the homeless, clothing for the needy and medical attention
to the poor.

Clearly, this is service to the public.

At oral argument defendant's counsel repeatedly argued
that defendant currently donates only three percent of its
income to charitable causes.

This Court would observe that

the definition of public service looks to whether the agency
was "established" to provide public service.

Whether defendant

has in fact all but abandoned the laudable purposes for which
it was established has no bearing on the fact that defendant
was established to provide public service.

Therefore, this

Court finds that defendant is a "public service" as that term
is defined in the Act.
rA
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Having found defendant to be a public service it is not
necessary that this Court determine whether defendant is a
place of public accommodation.

Traditional places of public

accommodation include hotels and restaurants.

Concord Rod &

Gun Club, Inc v Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
402 Mass 716; 524 NE2d 1364 (1988).

In this case, defendant

operated a de facto public restaurant.

Further, they opened

to the public for weekly bingo games and annual gift and craft
shows.

Therefore, this Court concludes that defendant is a

place of public accommodation.
Defendant argues that even if it falls within the
definitions of § 302, it is entitled to the private club exemption
under § 303 of the Act:
Sec. 303. This article shall not
apply to a private club, or other
establishment not in fact open to the
public, except to the extent that the
goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of the
private club or establishment are made
available to the customers or patrons
of another establishment that is a place
of public accommodation or is licensed
by the state under Act No. 8 of the
Public Acts of 1933, being sections 436.1
through 436.58 of the Michigan Compiled
Laws. MCL 37.2303; MSA 3.548(310).
In Rogers v International Association of Lions Club,
636 F Supp 1476, 1479 (ED Mich 1986), the Court considered
four factors in determining the Lions Club was not a private
club under this Section:

"The organization's size, selectivity,

public services offered, and use of public facilities."
Court placed special emphasis on selectivity.

The

In Cornelius v

Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 382 F Supp 1182 (D Conn
1974), the Court considered eight factors in determining that
the Groton, Connecticut Elks Club was a private club under
similar federal legislation.

The Court found that the most

significant factors were selectivity, formal membership procedure

and membership control over the admission of new members.
In the absence of controlling Michigan case law, federal case
law may be. helpful in deciding civil rights cases.
Chrysler Corp, 114 Mich App 670, 678 (1982).

Bouwman v

However, this

case must be decided on its own facts.
In this case the factors of size and selectivity
weigh heavily against finding defendant to be a private club.
Defendant has over 1,800 members and the only limitations on
its size are recently self-imposed.
1.5 million members.
unlimited in size.

Nationally, there are

Like the Lions, the Elks are potentially

Rogers, supra, p 1479.

The defendant has

the same formal membership procedure as was outlined in Cornelius,
supra.

This case indistinguishable from Cornelius in that

plaintiff has presented facts showing that the membership
procedure is a mere formality.

No significant process of

selection can be found in a process that weeds out less than
two percent of the applicants, most of whom were disqualified
for reasons pertaining to citizenship.

As stated in Rogers,

supra, p 1480, "the essence of privacy is selectivity.

If

there is little or no selectivity, there is no basis to the
claim of privacy."

This Court finds that defendant has not

conducted itself as a private club and therefore, does not
qualify for the private club exemption.
Defendant also argues that any decision which forces if
to open its doors to women will violate its members1 constitutions
right to choose with whom they will freely associate.

This

Court is not blind to the fact that persons of the same gender
may wish to form an association for mutual enrichment, friendship
and close ties.

Such relationships should be protected from

state intrusion.

This type of constitutional argument was

recognized in Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609,

104 S Ct 3244, 82 Ed 2d 462 (1984).

It appears that the same

factors which make a private club truly private also give rise
to the types of relationships which the right of association
insulates from governmental interference:
Among other things, therefore, they are
distinguished by such attributes as
relative smallness, a high degree of
selectivity in decisions to begin and
maintain the affiliation, and seclusion
from others in critical aspects of the
relationship. As a general matter,
only relationships with these sorts of
qualities are likely t^ reflect the
considerations that have led to -an
understanding of freedom of association
as an intrinsic element of personal
liberty.
Roberts, supra, 468 CTS 670.

For the ^ame reasons that this

Court finds defendant not to be a private club this Court also
finds defendant not to be the type of organization protected
by the right of association.
nor selective.

Defendant simply is neither small

Defendant lacks the distinctive characteristics

that might afford constitutional protection to its decision
to exclude women members.
Finally, at oral argument defendant argued that by
requiring it to admit women to membership, this Court will
discourage the Elks and other men's organizations from pursuing
charitable activities.

This Court fi^ds it hard to believe

that the prospect of having to admit Vomen would cause the
defendant to abandon its primary objective of "charity in its
broadest significance."

Opening the qoors to female membership

in the Lions and Jaycees has not sounqed the death knell for
these charitable organizations.

Furthermore, nothing in this

Opinion should be construed to mean that private male-only
associations lose their privilege to Exclude women when they
do charitable works.

p*+*~r,

club abandons its priva-

that privilege is lost when the
.racterist.iC3 Q f smallness and

selectivity of membership.
For the foregoing reasons this Court finds that the
decision of .the Rochester Elks to reject plaintiff's application
violates the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act.

Defendant is ordered

to reconsider plaintiff's application without consideration
of gender.

The issue of costs and attorney fees is reserved

for later decision.

HILDA R. fcASe

cmcurrjuooe
HILDA R. GAGE
Circuit Court Judge

Dated:

November. 15, 1989
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